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OPTIMAL HACKBACK
JAY P. KESAN AND RUPERTO MAJUCA*
INTRODUCTION
In real space, various instances of self-help have been recognized by
the law, ranging from the use of reasonable force in self-defense' or in
defense of property in criminal law,2 recovery of property3 and summary
abatement of nuisance 4 in tort law, to repossession 5 and commercial arbi-
tration6 in commercial law, to the right of restraint and self-help eviction
remedies in landlord-tenant relations7 and even to such areas as the First
* Jay P. Kesan is a Professor of law at the University of Illinois College of Law. Ruperto Maju-
ca is an Assistant Professor of economics at Weber State University. This is a transcript of a presenta-
tion made at the "Data Devolution: Corporate Information Security, Consumers and the Future of
Regulation" conference on February 3-4, 2006 at the University of Florida's Levin College of Law. A
complete version of this work can be found on the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1363932.
1. For a discussion of self-defense, see, for example, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Self-defense and
the State, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 449 (2008); Kenneth W. Simons, Self-Defense: Reasonable Beliefs or
Reasonable Self Control?, II NEW CRIM. L. REV. 51 (2008); Jeannie Suk, The True Woman: Scenes
from the Law of Self-Defense, 31 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 237 (2008).
2. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04, 3.06 (1985). For a discussion of defense of property, see, for
example, Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights of Self-Defense and Defense of Property, II TEX.
REV. L. & POL. 399 (2007).
3. For a discussion of self-help in recovery of property, see, for example, Henry E. Smith, Self-
Help and the Nature of Property, I J. L. ECON. & POL'Y 69 (2005).
4. For a discussion of summary abatement of nuisance, see, for example, Carmon M. Harvey,
Protecting the Innocent Property Owner: Takings Law in the Nuisance Abatement Context, 75 TEMP. L.
REV. 635 (2002); David J. Hungeling, Abatement of Nuisances Generally, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 211
(1999); Mary B. Spector, Crossing the Threshold: Examining the Abatement of Public Nuisances
Within the Home, 31 CONN. L. REV. 547 (1999).
5. For a discussion of repossession, see generally, John I. Karesh, Repossession and Foreclosure
of Aircraft from the Perspective of the Federal Aviation Act and The Uniform Commercial Code, 65 J.
AIR L. & COM. 695 (2000); Patrick B. McClure, The Loch Ness Monster, Big Foot, Repossession Titles
and Other Myths: Defenses and Counterclaims in a Repossession as an Alternative to Bankruptcy, 27
N. KY. L. REV. 360 (2000); Robbin Rahman, Electronic Self-Help Repossession and You: A Computer
Software Vendor's Guide to Staying Out of Jail, 48 EMORY L.J. 1477 (1999).
6. For a discussion of commercial arbitration, see, for example, Faisal Kutty, The Shari'a Factor
in International Commercial Arbitration, 28 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 565 (2006); Richard E.
Speidel, Parties Power to Vary Standards for Review of International Commercial Arbitration Awards,
8 NEV. L.J. 314 (2007); Winston Stromberg, Avoiding the Full Court Press: International Commercial
Arbitration and Other Global Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1337
(2007).
7. For a discussion of self-help in landlord-tenant relations, see, for example, Randy G. Gerchick,
No Easy Way Out: Making the Summary Eviction Process a Fairer and More Efficient Alternative to
Landlord Self-Help, 41 UCLA L. REV. 759 (1994).
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Amendment, 8 trade secret law 9 and patent law. 10 Self-help in cyberspace
has, however, been ignored.
There are several approaches that have been suggested to deal with the
problem of Internet attacks, ranging from technological solutions, I I to legal
solutions,12 to economic solutions.13 One approach in dealing with Internet
attacks is self-help--using reasonable force in self-defense against hack-
ers. 14 This work contends that there is a legitimate case to be made for the
ability to defend oneself in the instance of a digital attack through the In-
temet. 15
In the course of this work, we ask a number of questions. Should so-
ciety permit hackback? 16 How should the law on self-defense in cyberspace
be designed? Which among the tools of combating cybercrimes-law en-
forcement, court litigation, hacking back the hacker-should be used to
most effectively address cybercrimes? What optimal mix of these alterna-
tives should be used to combat cyber-attacks? What role does technology
play?
8. For a discussion of the First Amendment, see generally, Jeff Breinholt, Resolved, or is it? The
First Amendment and Giving Money to Terrorists, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1273, 1277-78 (2008); Catherine
J.K. Sandoval, Antitrust Language Barriers: First Amendment Constraints on Defining an Antitrust
Market by a Broadcast's Language, and its Implications for Audiences, Competition, and Democracy,
60 FED. COMM. L.J. 407, 436-41 (2008); Frederick Schauer, Hohfeld's First Amendment, 76 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 914, 915 (2008).
9. For a discussion of trade secret law, see, for example, Charles Tait Graves, Trade Secrets as
Property: Theory and Consequences, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 39 (2007); Julie Piper, I have a Secret?:
Applying the Uniform Trade Secrets Act to Confidential Information That Does Not Rise to the Level of
Trade Secret Status, 12 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 359 (2008); Michael Risch, Why Do We Have
Trade Secrets? 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1 (2007).
10. For a discussion of patent law, see generally, Scott D. Locke, Business Method Patents: The
Challenge of Coping with an Ever Changing Standard of Patentability, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1079 (2008); Stephen M. MeJohn, Patents: Hiding From History, 24 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 961 (2008); Tinna C. Otero, Banning Tax Strategy Patents-Should We
Listen to the Tax Practitioners?, 48 JURIMETRICS 309 (2008).
11. For a discussion of technology based remedies to cyber attacks, see, for example, Lilian
Edwards, Dawn of the Death of Distributed Denial of Service: How to Kill Zombies, 24 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 23 (2006).
12. For a discussion of legal remedies to cyber attacks, see, for example, Jennifer A. Chandler,
Security in Cyberspace: Combating Distributed Denial of Service Attacks, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J.
231 (2004).
13. For a discussion of economics based remedies to cyber attacks, see, for example, Debin Liu,
The Economics of Proof-Of Work, 3 US: J. L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 337 (2007).
14. See Curtis E. A. Karnow, Launch on Warning: Aggressive Defense of Computer Systems, 7
YALE J. L. & TECH. 87, 87 (2005).
15. Id. at 88.
16. For a discussion of hacking back, see, for example, Neal Katyal, Community Self-Help, I J.L.
ECON. & POL'Y 33 (2005).
[Vol 84:3
OPTIMAL HACKBACK
I. SELF-DEFENSE
Self-defense springs from the natural instinct for self-preservation, and
hackback should not be banned outright-it is generally accepted that one
has the right to defend one's self and one's property and, towards this end,
use reasonable force. 17 Aurelius Augustinus, generally acknowledged as
the first to have articulated the "just war" doctrine, 18 points out that war
must be exercised by the sovereign and must be waged in order to achieve
peace and not for "love of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and implaca-
ble enmity, wild resistance, and the lust of power, and such like."' 9 Hugo
Grotius, generally known as the father of modem international law, 20 arti-
culated that a just war must contain these basic elements: immediate danger
to the nation, necessity of the force employed to adequately defend the
nation's interests, and proportionality of the force employed to the threat-
ened danger.21 Applying these elements to the question of hackback, we
begin to see its justifications.
A. The Alleged Problems with Hacking Back
The litany of criticisms of hackback 22 include the possibility of misi-
dentification of the hacker against whom to retaliate, use of automated
program by counter-strikers that will escalate out of control, "shoot-outs"
between trigger-happy defenders and intruders, and self-proclaimed "white
hats" who release worm patches with good intentions, but end up with bad
results.2 3 However, the fact that the exercise of a limited right to hackback
can be abused does not necessarily mean that the right should be denied at
the outset; it does, however, mean that the exercise of this privilege should
17. See Simmons, supra note 1.
18. For a discussion of the just war doctrine, see, for example, Joseph L. Falvey, Jr., Our Cause is
Just: An Analysis of Operation Iraqi Freedom Under International Law and the Just War Doctrine, 2
AVE MARIA L. REV. 65 (2004); Alexander C. Linn, The Just War Doctrine and State Liability for
Paramilitary War Crimes, 34 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 619 (2006); Thomas C. Wingfield, The Conver-
gence of Traditional Theory and Modern Reality: Just War Doctrine and Tyrannical Regimes, 2 AvE
MARIA L. REV. 93, 98-108 (2004).
19. See Augustine infra note 39, at 73-79, 400, 423.
20. For a discussion of Grotius, see, for example, T.M.C. ASSER INSTITUUT, THE HAGUE,
GROTIUs READER (L.E. Van Holk & C.G. Roelofsen eds., 1983).
21. Mark Edward DeForrest, Just War Theory and the Recent U.S. Air Strikes Against Iraq, I
GONZ. J. INT'L L. (1998), available at http://www.gonzagajil~org/content/view/72/26.
22. Some commentators point out the potential dangers associated with hackback. Katyal argues
that private self-help methods not only raise distributional issues but also weaken the connectivity
between people, and individual self-help can cripple interconnectivity and destroy reciprocity. See Neal
Katyal, Community Self-Help, I J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 33, 61-65 (2005). See also Susan Brenner, Hack-
back as Self-Defense, Mar. 24, 2007, http://cyb3rcrim3.blogspot.com/2007/03/hackback-as-self-
defense.html.
23. See Katyal, supra note 22, at 62.
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be regulated.
B. The Benefits of Hacking Back
The public and the private sector should be more engaged in the battle
against cybercrime. The thought that we should empower ourselves and say
to hackers, "this is my property, get out," in the same way that we some-
times (and within limits) allow people to defend real property transgres-
sions is both appealing and worrisome. A legitimate concern that this
approach raises for some people would be "What is going on here-
vigilantism?" 24 We are not supporting an unbridled right to hackback.
What we are saying is that there are some limited situations, for example
computer intrusions, 25 where litigation is truly not only impractical but also
too costly.
One major argument in favor of hackback is that traditional law en-
forcement schemes simply do not work in cyberspace because of the speed
by which attacks cause damage to e-commerce sites and also because hack-
ers can stage attacks from multiple jurisdictions with varying cybercrime
laws and procedures for prosecuting internet crimes.26 If you are a hacker
yourself, you are arguably in the best position to effectively identify and
retaliate against someone attacking your systems.
As long as the appropriate technology exists, there is a very strong
possibility of the victim correctly identifying the hacker or knowing who
the hacker is and of taking him out quickly and efficiently through retalia-
tion.27 Looking at the numbers in terms of damage due to hacking, the
numbers are very significant, and to the extent that you can mitigate the
damage to your system and, to the extent that it outweighs damage to third
24. For a discussion of vigilantism, see, for example, Alex B. Eyssen, Does Community Notifica-
tion for Sex Offenders Violate the Eighth Amendment's Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Pu-
nishment? A Focus on Vigilantism Resulting from "Megan's Law, " 33 ST. MARY'S L.J. 101 (2001);
Kelly D. Hine, Vigilantism Revisited: An Economic Analysis of the Law of Extra-Judicial Self-Help or
Why Can't Dick Shoot Henry for Stealing Jane's Truck, 47 Am. U. L. REV. 1221 (1998); Christopher J.
Walker, Border Vigilantism and Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 10 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 135
(2007).
25. For a discussion of computer intrusion, see generally Christine D. Galbraith, Access Denied:
Improper Use of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to Control Information on Publicly Accessible
Internet Websites, 63 MD. L. REV. 320 (2004); Carrie Greenplate, Of Protection and Sovereignty:
Applying the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Extraterritorially To Protect Embedded Software Out-
sourced to China, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 129 (2007); Scott Zambo, Digital La Cosa Nostra: The Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act's Failure to Punish and Deter Organized Crime, 33 NEw ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV.
CONFNEMENT 551 (2007).
26. Kamow, supra note 14, at 89.
27. For a discussion of technology available to identify a hacker, see, for example, Bruce P.
Smith, Hacking Poaching and Counterattacking: Digital Counterstrikes and the Contours of Self-Help,
1 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 171 (2005).
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parties, self-defense is worth seriously thinking about.2 8
There is a role to be played by the choice of technology, and this
clearly is an important role. Obviously we want to create incentives for
people to use state-of-the-art hackback technology. There is a distinction
between someone who hacked my system to just show me that they can get
into the system and the person who is seeking to cause real harm.29 Being
able to distinguish these two types of intruders and mounting a proportio-
nate response is the key. It is also important to look at the potential liability
to third party systems. Again, the reasonableness of the response is ex-
tremely important, as is the accuracy of the trace.
II. BUILDING A LIMITED RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE IN CYBERSPACE
When does it make sense to legally give someone the right to hack-
back and when does it not?
A. Predicting Behavior
Let us begin by considering what a firm's options are during a denial
of service attack; what might the firm do? The firm might do nothing, and
merely attempt to recover its computer system and prevent further harm.
The firm might invest in an improved intrusion detection system and fire
walls to prevent future attacks. The firm might even go out and buy cyber
insurance. 30 The firm may decide to litigate and prosecute an intruder by
filing a complaint with the U.S. Attorneys' Office or pursuing a private suit
against an attacker. The third option may be to hackback. Let us try to un-
derstand these three options in greater detail. We employed formal game
theory3l to model the strategic interaction between the firm and the hacker.
This allowed us to study the behavior of the hacker given the effectiveness
of law enforcement and the potential counter-actions of the firm, and the
28. Jay Kesan & Ruperto Majuca, Hacking Back: Optimal Use of Self-Defense in Cyberspace,
http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/microsites/cybersafety/?viewpapers (last visited May 22, 2009).
29. For a discussion behind the motives of hackers and the different types of harm they seek to
cause, see for example, Michael L. Rudstad, Private Enforcement of Cybercrime on the Electronic
Frontier, 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 63 (2001).
30. For a discussion of cyber insurance, see, for example, Wendy S. Meyer Insurance Coverage
for Potential Liability Arising from Internet Privacy Issues, 28 J. CORP. L. 335, 341-42 (2003).
31. For a discussion of game theory, see generally Chris J. Katopis, Perfect Happiness?: Game
Theory as a Tool for Enhancing Patent Quality, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 360, 380-81 (2008); Steven H.
Kropp, Corporate Governance, Executive Compensation, Corporate Performance, and Worker Rights
in Bankruptcy: Some Lessons From Game Theory, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 15-23 (2007); Ji Li, When
Are There More Laws? When Do They Matter? Using Game Theory to Compare Laws, Power Distribu-
tion, and Legal Environments in the United States and China, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 335, 344-51
(2007).
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inverse, and also capture the interaction between law enforcement, court
remedies, and self-help remedies. From the Nash equilibria 32 that flow
from the model, 33 we observe that the firm will find that police enforce-
ment works best in certain instances, while in some cases, resort to the
courts based on civil liability litigation will be the better approach, and in
still other situations, self-defense and self-help will best address the cyber-
crimes problem.34
What you begin to see when these equilibria are analyzed is that there
is a boundary where hacking back is a sensible option. But simultaneously,
there are also important roles to be played by self insurance and litigation.
When looking at the various options available, it is not so much that hack-
ing back is a substitute for the various kinds of remedies available in the
law; rather, it is an important option that is available when there is an ina-
bility for public solutions to provide a welfare-maximizing option.
What exactly is the role of technology? There have been real im-
provements in the ability to, even in a dynamic internet protocol world,
figure out relatively well who is an attacker and who is hiding the attack-
ers. 35 A world with better intrusion detection systems is a world where you
have better technologies to trace back who the attacker is, allowing you to
assess the danger and come up with a narrower, better response. If you are
able to do that, then you have a higher probability of hitting the hacker and
a lower probability of being liable for third party damages.
Essentially, there is a disconnect between private solutions and social-
ly-optimal solutions, and that is basically what you see here. You can struc-
ture liability rules to work in a manner so that it guides the private solution
to the socially-optimal solution. In other words, what you are really trying
to do is create liability rules that ensure a firm uses a hackback only when it
is socially optimal to do so.
This type of structure does not entirely eliminate all of the problems.
There are still social problems, for example, the problem of third parties
poorly building systems for a company and consequently unexpected
events happening that have not been remedied. There are additional costs
32. For a more complete explanation of the Nash Equilibrium that resulted from the model, see,
for example, Kesan, supra note 28.
33. Id.
34. Forensic investigation takes time, but a virus or worm spreads quickly, swift action is needed
to mitigate the grave damage that security incidents can cause. Epstein has argued that self-help plays a
role because judicial remedy is often too slow. See Richard A. Epstein The Theory and Practice of Self-
Help, I J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 1, 26 (2005).
35. See Robert McMillan, Microsoft Botnet-Hunting Tool Helps Bust Hackers,
NETWORKWORLD.CoM, Apr. 29, 2008, http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/042908-microsoft-
botnet-hunting-tool-helps-bust.html.
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associated with these types of risk, and hence, some regulation and ob-
viously some legal regimes are needed in addition to the simple liability
rule.36
B. Socially Optimal Hackback
When is hackback optimal? Our game-theoretic model details the fol-
lowing criteria for the valid exercise of self-defense in cyberspace: (1) ac-
counting for traceback costs, the damage to the attacked firm's (that is, the
entity that is hacking back) systems that can be potentially mitigated out-
weighs the potential damage to third parties; (2) hackback does not result in
greater harm to innocent parties compared to the damage to the defender's
(i.e., the attacked firm's) systems that is sought to be mitigated; and (3)
there is a relatively high chance of hitting the hacker, instead of innocent
third parties, and recourse to police enforcement or civil litigation is either
ineffective or impractical. Furthermore, due care should be exercised to
avoid or minimize damage to third parties, and the purpose of the hackback
should be limited to the prevention of damage to the firm's information
technology infrastructure. The results also underscore the importance of
using good technology (that is, intrusion detection systems (IDS), and tra-
ceback technology) in order for hackback to be effective as a deterrent
against cyber-attacks. These criteria and guidelines articulate the circums-
tances under which self-defense is proper in cyberspace, and also the situa-
tions in which we should instead rely on the criminal justice system or the
courts.
Using this game-theoretic model of the interaction between the de-
fender and the hacker, we were able to capture the interplay between legal
remedies (police enforcement and court litigation), technology (IDS and
trace back), and economic incentives (cost and benefits of self-help reme-
dies), and thus develop specific rules or tests for resolving whether resort to
hackback is justified. Based on the results of the model, the criteria for
determining whether resorting to hackback is optimal are: (1) low availabil-
ity of other alternatives, such as criminal enforcement and/or resorting to
litigation, or where the use of these alternatives is impractical or ineffec-
tive; (2) where a more defensive strategy, such as recovering damages or
dropping incoming packets, would not deter the hacker; (3) the likelihood
of hitting the hacker instead of innocent third parties is high; and (4) where
the damage to the defender's systems cannot be mitigated to a point that
36. Larry Ponemon, Costs of a Data Breach: Can You Afford $6.65 Million?, Feb. 4, 2009,
COMPUTERWORLD, http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&
articleld =9127376.
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does not warrant risking potential damage to innocent third parties.
Additionally, when hackback is justified, the two following rules
should govern conduct during hackback. First, defenders must not use ex-
cessive force, that is, they must only use force necessary to defend their
property and not needlessly destroy the hacker's digital assets. Even if ac-
ceptable preconditions are present-and thus the exercise of the privilege is
justified-the conduct during hackback must also be regulated by the law.
Counter-strikers must also use only "proportionate force," that is, they must
not wantonly damage the hackers' digital systems out of retaliation, but
rather, only use force that is necessary to avoid damage to their own sys-
tems. In sum, the law needs to layer liability rules on top of the reasonable-
ness conditions.
Second, counter-strikers would be held liable for damage to third par-
ties. Thus, liability rules should be set in place so that firms internalize the
damage to third parties, thereby bringing the private incentive to hackback
closer to the socially-optimal outcome. In order to internalize the damage
to third parties, active defenders should be held liable to third parties
caught in the crossfire. Not holding active defenders responsible for the
consequences of their action will result in externalities and excessive
amount of hackback activity. In sum, the law should layer the third-party
liability rules on top of the reasonableness conditions.
These reasonableness conditions are consistent with the economic ap-
proach in tort law, 37 which balances the rights of firms seeking to mitigate
damages to their systems and of third parties not being forced to suffer
economic harm. These added regulations are necessary in order to move
the firm's Nash equilibrium outcome towards the socially-optimal result.
For example, making firms liable for third-party damages will cause them
to internalize the potential damage to third parties as a result of their deci-
sion-making, and ensure that firms behave closer to the socially-optimal
outcome. Because counterstrikes can misfire and damage innocent third
parties, what passes as self-defense may in reality be another wrong. There-
fore, reasonableness standards must be applied and hacking victims should
resort to legal remedies rather than counter-attacks in those situations
where a reasonable response is not possible.
As it turns out, these conditions resemble the traditional formulation
of the "just war" doctrine, which requires the following elements for a valid
counterstrike: (1) there is grave damage (greater than the damage that
might result from the action) that will be inflicted to the defender unless it
37. Winond Emons & Joel Sobel, On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules When Agents Are Not
Identical, 58 REV. OF ECON. STUD. 375, 377-78 (1991).
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counter-strikes, (2) there is a serious prospect of success, and (3) other
means for stopping the evil are either impractical or ineffective. 38 Interes-
tingly, our requirement that counter strikers should not wantonly damage
the hacker's system and use only necessary force echoes the classical au-
thors' position that war must not be waged for "revengeful cruelty" 39 and
that only necessary and proportionate force ought to be used.40
Thus, in our view, the law should in some instances allow self-help
remedies, yet at the same time regulate the exercise of the privilege so as to
check against its potential abuse. 4 1 Given the potential benefits self-help
can generate when used responsibly, regulating the exercise of the privilege
is the best way to deal with these potential excesses. In short, active de-
fense is an extraordinary remedy, available only when other alternatives are
ineffective or impractical and when there is a serious prospect of success.
There must be a relatively high chance of hitting the hacker, instead of
hitting innocent persons. Thus, reasonable effort must be exerted to employ
state-of-the-art trace back technology. This helps the firm to carefully as-
certain the existence or the imminence of the attack or potential danger.
Furthermore, it also decreases the error of hitting innocent persons and
enhances the deterrent effect of hackback. If a firm hacks back without
these conditions being present, it oversteps the bounds for reasonable exer-
cise of self-defense in cyberspace. The law can hold those who exercise
self-help illegally liable for penalties.
CONCLUSION
Using a game theoretic model, we have described what we think the
law on self-defense in cyberspace should be. There is no apparent reason
why the law should outright ban firms from exercising self-defense in cy-
berspace. Active self-defense can deter criminals preemptively and sup-
plement law enforcement. Also, once precedents of hacking back are
known in the hacker community, such attacks may decline. Absent the
showing of widespread misuse, self-defense through hackback should not
be outlawed.
38. DeForrest, supra note 21.
39. Aurelius Augustine, Reply to Faustus the Manichaean, in WRITINGS IN CONNECTION WITH
THE MANICHAEAN HERESY 145, 463, 463-68 (Marcus Dods ed., Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark 1872).
40. For a discussion of necessary and proportionate force, see, for example, Stuart P. Green,
Castles and Carjackers: Proportionality and the Use of Deadly Force in Defense of Dwellings and
Vehicles, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (1999); Kenneth W. Simons, Self-Defense: Reasonable Beliefs or
Reasonable Self-Control? 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 51 (2008).
41. For a discussion of the abuse of self-help, see, for example, Gerchick, supra note 7, at 773-77.
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